University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
8-2022

Hurting to Helping: Regret as a Potential Motivator of Helping
Behavior
Chandler Ann Findley
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons

Citation
Findley, C. A. (2022). Hurting to Helping: Regret as a Potential Motivator of Helping Behavior. Graduate
Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/4623

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Hurting to Helping:
Regret as a Potential Motivator of Helping Behavior

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Experimental Psychology

by

Chandler Ann Findley
University of Arkansas
Bachelor of Science in Psychology, 2019
Birmingham-Southern College

August 2022
University of Arkansas

This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

____________________________________
Denise R. Beike, Ph.D.
Thesis Chair

_________________________________
Jennifer C. Veilleux, Ph.D.

_________________________________
Anastasia Makhanova, Ph.D.

Abstract
Previous research has suggested that emotions can influence people’s motivation to engage in
prosocial behaviors. Even negatively-valenced emotions, like sadness, guilt, and shame, have
been shown to motivate prosocial behaviors. Exploratory analyses of a previous study indicated
that regret may also motivate increased prosocial intentions, but no research has been published
to experimentally test whether feelings of regret may motivate prosocial behaviors. Therefore,
the present research seeks to experimentally manipulate participants’ current emotional state to
empirically examine whether regret motivates greater helping behavior than other, similar
negative emotions that have already been demonstrated to motivate prosocial behaviors in
humans. These studies will also use two separate samples to examine potential age differences
in the effects of regret on prosocial behavior. Study 1 indicated that there were no differences in
prosocial behavior between emotion conditions but there was a marginal difference between the
undergraduate and Prolific samples. Study 2 replicated these results and further suggests that
prosocial behavior may be motivated by altruism rather than egotism.
Keywords: altruism, regret, guilt, sadness, prosocial behavior
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Hurting to Helping: Regret as a Potential Motivator of Helping Behavior
The Functional Theory of Emotions (Keltner & Gross, 1999) posits that all emotions
have a function, and typically that function is believed to be adaptive. In many cases, the
adaptive functions of emotions also lead to prosocial behaviors. Prosocial behaviors are
behaviors that are intended to benefit another person, but may not necessarily come only from a
place of altruism (Barón et al., 2018). What might perhaps be a more concrete example of what
prosocial behaviors look like would be actions taken specifically to help another person other
than oneself, such as volunteering one’s time and expertise, sharing one’s resources, or even
something as small as working together with other individuals to achieve a common goal.
Interestingly, many emotions have been found to motivate helping behaviors, and not all of these
emotions are positively-valenced. Specifically, sadness, guilt, and shame have all been shown to
motivate helping, but theorists believe that these emotions motivate helping for different reasons.
Negative State Relief Model
The Negative State Relief model (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976) takes a slightly pessimistic
perspective on the altruism that experiencing negative emotions, like sadness, appears to
motivate. Specifically, the Negative State Relief model posits that what most people consider to
be altruism is merely a form of hedonism, in that adults experiencing sadness—or any other form
of negative mood, for that matter—may only engage in prosocial behaviors for the sake of selfgratification (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). In other words, according to the Negative State Relief
model, people who feel sad tend to help another person if they believe that the act of helping will
benefit them in some way, even if that benefit is only as small as feeling better about themselves
due to the rewarding nature of engaging in prosocial behaviors. While much of the research on
the Negative State Relief model examines the effects of feelings of sadness specifically,
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experiencing any negatively-valenced emotion could potentially have the same effects. For
example, service employees’ negative daily interactions with customers have been shown to not
only predict increased negative mood the next morning, but also predict an increased likelihood
for the person experiencing a negative mood to engage in greater helping behaviors toward their
coworkers as well as their customers (Yue et al., 2017). These effects of negative mood on
helping behaviors do appear to be related to experience, however, because younger children
show far less altruism than adults in studies done on prosocial behaviors motivated by negative
mood (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). In other words, children have not yet learned that helping
others might relieve the negative emotions they are experiencing, so Negative State Relief effects
are not observed as frequently in children as in adults.
Sadness and Prosocial Behavior
That being said, sadness is one of the better researched negatively-valenced emotions that
has been associated with prosocial behaviors. Sadness is one of the seven basic or universal
emotions believed to be experienced by everyone around the world, and it is characterized by a
sense of loss or lack, although the exact nature of the loss or lack that causes feelings of sadness
may vary among cultures (Eckman, 1999). Regardless of its cause, sadness is believed to be a
signal that help is needed, so it must come as little surprise that viewing someone else who is
feeling sadness has also been found to motivate prosocial behaviors (Eckman, 1999). It has been
found previously that identifying and empathizing with sadness in others can motivate people to
engage in prosocial lying—the so-called “little white lies” people tell to make others feel better
about a bad situation—especially in situations where the person identifying another person’s
sadness is skilled at perspective-taking (Xu et al., 2019). This tendency to engage in prosocial
lying is specifically believed to be done in an effort to show benevolence toward the person
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experiencing sadness, so as to offer that sad person comfort in whatever small measure the
prosocial lies might provide (Xu et al., 2019).
Experiencing sadness for oneself also has been shown to make people more willing to
spend more time and donate more money to help other people, when compared to a neutral
control condition and an angry condition (Yang et al., 2017). Furthermore, people experiencing
sadness were far more likely to engage in helping behaviors when they believed that the person
or people they were helping needed help due to uncontrollable circumstances, rather than a
problem that would be fully under that other person’s control to resolve (Yang et al., 2017).
These examples indicate that experiencing sadness certainly does signal a need for help, and
people who experience sadness, either directly or empathetically, are also more likely to actually
help other people in a number of different ways.
Self-Conscious Moral Emotions
Sadness is a basic emotion, but guilt and shame are part of a category of emotions known
as self-conscious moral emotions (SCMEs). SCMEs are defined as emotions associated with the
interests and welfare of society as a whole, which are experienced only after self-reflection
(Haidt, 2003). So, in contrast to basic emotions like sadness, SCMEs are not necessarily
experienced by everyone and they do not occur automatically but rather involve a cognitive
component of self-reflection based on societal and cultural norms. SCMEs are also thought to
differ from basic emotions in that they are typically elicited by problems or triumphs that do not
directly affect the self, and that they typically have prosocial action tendencies (Haidt, 2003).
So, while we may feel sad if something bad happens to us personally, we would instead feel
guilty or ashamed, perhaps, if something bad happened to another person or to society as a whole
because of us. It is worth noting, however, that there are varying degrees to which different
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SCMEs elicit prosocial behaviors, and some certainly do a better job at it than others (Haidt,
2003).
Guilt and Prosocial Behavior
Guilt, for example, is a negatively-valenced self-conscious emotion that has been shown
to motivate prosocial behaviors. Guilt is a sense of unease or repentance that people experience
when they recognize that someone else has been harmed by their own actions or failure to act
(Tangney et al., 2007). In other words, guilt is experienced when a person realizes that they have
done something bad that has hurt another person. Guilt is a distinctly interpersonal emotion,
experienced when harm comes to another as a result of one’s own decisions and actions
(Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008). Guilt is also considered to be a relatively adaptive emotion.
The experience of guilt is said to motivate reparative actions, so as to undo the consequences of
whatever actions (or lack thereof) have caused one to experience that guilt (Tangeney et al.,
2007). Additionally, guilt is considered adaptive because it tends to generate other-focused
sympathy and more constructive reactions to anger from other people, such as engaging in
nonhostile discussions with the wrongdoer in order to resolve the situation (Tangeney et al.,
2007).
Interestingly, the reparative actions motivated by feelings of guilt do not necessarily have
to consist of directly undoing a transgression, but instead often consist of doing something to
make up for a transgression. For example, in a study with children, the participants in the
experimental condition were told that they took the last sparkly ball to play with and because of
that, another child called Emma wasn’t able to play with it and was sad now, so rather than
offering the sparkly ball to Emma, they instead gave her a greater share of the stickers that were
meant to be their reward for participating at the study when given an opportunity to do so
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(Donohue & Tully, 2019). Some of these child participants even indicated specifically that they
gave Emma extra stickers to make up for making her sad by taking the last sparkly ball
(Donohue & Tully, 2019). In a similar study with adults, participants in the guilt condition were
given the option of eating an apple-flavored jelly bean or a vomit-flavored jelly bean after being
told that someone else would have to eat the opposite flavor (Cryder et al., 2012). Participants
choosing to eat the apple-flavored jelly bean themselves and giving the vomit-flavored jelly bean
to someone else was meant to induce feelings of guilt. The participants in the guilt condition
then rated their guilt higher than those in the control condition and were also far more likely to
give a significantly greater share of $5 to the other person in a dictator task completed at the end
of the experiment (Cryder et al., 2012).
These effects of feelings of guilt on reparative actions can be observed not only in
situations where an actual transgression has occurred—or, at least, the participants believe an
actual transgression has occurred—but also in hypothetical situations that would elicit guilt. For
example, when adult participants were instructed to imagine that they were managers of a
property with garden-level housing that they had recently sold to several different people without
choosing to do anything to make those housing units flood-proof even under advice from an
architect to do so (Ghorbani et al., 2013). In this same scenario, a flood hits the area one year
after selling the housing units and most of the units are flooded, as the architect predicted, but
lawyers are not in agreement as to whether the manager must pay compensation for the damages
to the tenants because the manager chose not to flood-proof the housing units (Ghorbani et al.,
2013). The participants were then asked how much they would compensate the following types
of tenants in this hypothetical scenario: their parents, a relative other than their parents, close
friends, a retiree looking for a low-maintenance investment, a middle-class couple expecting
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their first child, a stranger they met at a social event, and a total stranger they know nothing
about (Ghorbani et al., 2013). The closer the participant felt to the hypothetical tenant, the more
guilt and shame they were likely to feel, and the more guilt participants felt, the more money
they indicated they would give to the tenant as compensation (Ghorbani, et al., 2013).
Shame and Prosocial Behavior
It is worth noting, however, that native English-speakers often confuse guilt with shame,
because there are very few meaningful nuances between the way the two terms are used in the
English language (Haidt, 2003). Shame, in contrast to guilt, is an overall negative selfevaluation when one has committed a moral transgression, either through breaking a rule or a
standard of behavior (Bonavia & Brox-Ponce, 2018). So unlike guilt which involves a feeling
that the action is bad, shame involves a feeling that the action one did means the actor is bad.
Although the two emotions are often experienced in similar ways, researchers have identified a
few factors that distinguish shame from guilt. For example, shame is typically elicited when one
commits a moral transgression witnessed or judged by one’s social betters, whereas guilt is
typically elicited when one has committed a moral transgression against someone in their
community (Haidt, 2003). Additionally, shame is considered a “public” emotion, in the sense
that it is believed that one can only experience shame when there are witnesses to the shameful
action, but witnesses are not a requirement to experience guilt (Tangeny et al., 2007). Finally,
shame focuses specifically on one’s evaluations of oneself, whereas guilt focuses only on one’s
actions (Tangeny et al., 2007).
A further distinction between guilt and shame is that the experience of guilt predicts
prosocial behaviors, while the experience of shame moderately predicts antisocial behaviors
(Barón et al., 2018). This pattern was observed in children rather than adults, but the evidence

7

does suggest that the experience of guilt is a stronger motivator of prosocial behavior than that of
shame, and experiencing guilt does indeed seem to consistently predict prosocial behaviors
(Barón et al., 2018).
This distinction could, perhaps, be explained by different types of shame experiences,
which seem to motivate different levels of prosocial behaviors. Specifically, endogenous
shame—shame relevant to the situation at hand—does predict prosocial behavior, while
exogenous shame—shame not relevant to the situation at hand—does not predict prosocial
behavior (de Hooge et al., 2008). So, in simpler terms, if someone feels shame that is relevant to
a situation where they would be required to decide to help someone, those feelings of shame will
likely motivate them to actually help because this type of shame acts as a commitment device (de
Hooge et al., 2008). An example of endogenous shame would be if after doing poorly on a
presentation at a conference an unknown colleague asked to switch seats at dinner that night. In
this case, the person feeling ashamed would be more likely to engage in prosocial norms and
switch seats in order to alleviate the shame when the situation cannot be avoided (de Hooge et
al., 2008). On the other hand, if someone feels shame for something that is irrelevant to a
situation where they might need to help someone, those feelings of shame are unlikely to
motivate them to actually help, because in general shame is considered an avoidance-motive
emotion (de Hooge et al., 2008). An example of exogenous shame would be if after doing
poorly on a presentation at a conference someone asked to switch seats on the airplane ride
home, the person feeling ashamed would not be likely to be motivated by their feelings of shame
when making their decision as to whether or not to switch seats, because they are no longer at the
conference or surrounded by colleagues (de Hooge et al., 2008). While this endogenous versus
exogenous distinction has not been explored in other SCMEs, it would not be far-fetched to
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assume that it may very well apply to other SCMEs, particularly emotions like regret where one
makes a negative assessment of one’s current self based on one’s past actions.
Regret and Prosocial Behavior
The primary emotion of interest in the current thesis is regret, and specifically its role in
motivating prosocial behavior. Regret has been defined as a comparison-based emotion of selfblame that comes from the realization one’s present condition could be better if one had only
made a different decision in the past (Zeelenberg & Pieter, 2007). In other words, regret is a
counterfactual emotion that involves feeling negative about one's current situation in favor of the
"what ifs" of what one's situation might have been had one acted differently at some point in the
past. In general, because regret is an emotion that feels negative while one is experiencing it,
most people would probably consider it to be a “bad” emotion. However, prior research has
found that in fact people tend to value regret over other related negative emotions, which is to
say in other words that people like regret more than they like other negative emotions and feeling
more regret than other people may make people feel better about themselves, possibly because of
the possibilities for self-improvement that come along with feelings of regret (Saffrey et al.,
2008).
Similarly to guilt, regret has also been shown to motivate reparative actions, which are
believed to alleviate feelings of regret. These reparative actions may look different from the
reparative actions taken in response to feelings of guilt, however. Primarily, reparative actions in
response to experiences of regret tend to take the form of finding silver linings to the regretful
experience, or in other words taking a significant, beneficial life lesson from the regretted
experience (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). An example of this might be if someone who regrets
doing poorly on an interview for a job decides that this poor performance might not be such a
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bad thing after all because now they are better prepared for the next interview they may have.
Finding silver linings or making meaning as a means of taking reparative action against
experiences of regret may take a couple of different forms. One form may look like extending
self-compassion to oneself when experiencing regret (Zhang & Chen, 2016). In fact, when reallife anonymous confessions to regrettable events were examined and coded by researchers, the
confessions in which the person expressed more self-compassion also had a significantly greater
self- and observer-rated level of self-improvement as a result of the regretful event (Zhang &
Chen, 2016).
People may also find silver linings to their regrettable experiences in feeling that just by
experiencing the regret, they have learned from their mistakes and will know not to make that
mistake again in the future (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Interestingly, it has been shown that
people do benefit from seeking out silver linings. Experiencing regret appears to cause egodepletion, making subsequent self-regulation tasks far more difficult for the person experiencing
regret (Gao et al., 2014). However, finding significance or benefits in the regretted event
appears to alleviate the effects of ego-depletion, thus improving people’s performance on selfregulation tasks after finding those silver linings (Gao et al., 2014). In other words, simply
finding benefits and life lessons in regretted events may actually serve as a form of reparative
action for the individual experiencing feelings of regret, even if the regretted event itself cannot
necessarily be undone.
The bulk of the literature regarding actual behaviors motivated by regret can be found in
the developmental psychology and business management fields. With regards to the
developmental literature on regret and prosocial behavior, much of it focuses on decision-making
tasks to determine how early feelings of regret emerge in children and how early feelings of
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regret may motivate adaptive behaviors in children. One study found that both feelings of regret
and adaptive behaviors motivated by regret emerge around the same time, at roughly 6 or 7 years
of age (O’Connor et al., 2014). Furthermore, these 6- and 7-year olds who experienced regret
were more likely to make adaptive decisions than their counterparts who did not experience
regret, even when controlling for age and verbal ability, which indicates that regret allows for
children to learn quickly from negative outcomes of their own decisions (O’Connor et al., 2014).
In a different developmental study done on adolescents and early adults, it was found that while
regret tends to affect people’s willingness to modify their future choices on gambling tasks, this
effect is far stronger in early adults than it is in adolescents (Habib et al., 2012). These findings
indicate that how people experience regret and what effects those experiences have on people’s
behavior continue to develop long past the time that feelings of regret first appear in early
childhood.
Within the business management literature, regret is examined mostly in the form of
gambling tasks and resource allocation. In one set of studies, regret was induced in two separate
ways across the studies, either via an autobiographical recall task in which participants were
asked to recall their greatest life regret or via an imagined regret scenario, after which point
participants engaged in a social bargaining game, either the ultimatum game or the 10-coin-givesome game (Martinez et al., 2009). In both regret-induction conditions, participants who
experienced regret also made more prosocial decisions in both types of social bargaining games,
whereas participants who experienced disappointment instead of regret made less prosocial
decisions (Martinez et al., 2009). The findings of this set of studies appear to support the
Negative State Relief model, given that the authors posit that these participants were attempting
to relieve their own negative feelings about the outcomes of the social bargaining games.
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Interestingly, a separate set of studies also found that observing someone else’s regret about a
decision can motivate people to change their behaviors (van der Schalk et al., 2015).
Specifically, participants who observed an exemplar expressing regret over making a fair
decision in a resource allocation task were less likely to make a fair decision when it was their
turn to engage in the task (van der Schalk et al., 2015). Meanwhile participants who observed an
exemplar expressing regret over making an unfair decision in the resource allocation task were
more likely to make fair decisions when it was their turn to engage in the task (van der Schalk et
al., 2015). The authors posited that these effects occurred specifically because of social appraisal
effects, which calls to mind the mechanism by which SCMEs typically motivate prosocial
behaviors.
While, as mentioned before, regret and guilt do have many similarities, they are
considered to be distinct emotions, just as guilt and shame are distinct emotions. It is not
uncommon for researchers to treat regret and guilt as the same emotion, and often people will
use the two terms interchangeably. However, the primary distinction between the experiences of
regret and guilt comes in the form of what type of harm elicits each emotion. Interpersonal harm
tends to elicit both regret and guilt; however intrapersonal harm tends only to elicit regret
(Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2008).
While there is clearly substantial evidence to indicate that the experience of emotions,
and even negative emotions, can influence people to behave more prosocially, there has yet to be
published evidence that this is true for the experience of regret, specifically. However, in a
previous study, I found a correlation between the experience of regret and prosocial intentions,
above and beyond experiences of any of several other emotions, including guilt, shame, and
sadness (Findley, 2020). Participants in this study were instructed to recall their most regretful,
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guilty, or shameful life experience, or the last time they went out to eat (Findley, 2020). It is
worth noting that these data were collected prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Following this induction of whichever emotion participants were randomly assigned to, they
were then asked to rate how strongly they felt a number of emotions, including regret, guilt, and
shame, in that moment and then were presented with a number of scenarios where they might
have an opportunity to behave prosocially were those situations to happen in real life, and they
indicated how likely they felt they would be to engage in prosocial behaviors in that moment
(Findley, 2020).
There was no effect of recalled autobiographical emotional experiences on reported
likelihood of prosocial behavior. However, when likelihood of prosocial behavior was regressed
on the strength of feeling regret, guilt, shame, and sadness, a more intense experience of regret—
but not any of the other negative emotions—predicted greater intentions of engaging in
hypothetical prosocial behaviors (Findley, 2020). While this study did not provide strong
enough evidence to conclude that feeling regret does truly make people behave in a more
prosocial manner, it does suggest that there is a link between regret and prosociality that has yet
to be explored in the existing literature. Thus, this thesis will focus on two studies conducted to
answer the question of whether experiencing regret motivates people to behave more prosocially
toward others, specifically in the form of engaging in helping behaviors, in order to examine this
gap in the current literature on regret.
The Present Research
While it is clear from the existing literature that negative emotions can and do motivate
prosocial behaviors, it is unclear why this may be the case when it comes to regret in my
previous study. On the one hand, it could be argued that regret is merely a negative emotion and,
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like sadness, could motivate people to behave more prosocially because such behaviors may
alleviate those negative feelings that come along with the experience of regret, per the Negative
State Relief model. On the other hand, regret, while not consistently considered a SCME like
guilt or shame by researchers, shares many similarities with traditional SCMEs and it is possible
that perhaps the prosocial motivation regret generated in my previous study could be because of
the prosocial action tendencies that SCMEs are characterized by. The aim of this thesis will be
to determine two things: Whether regret motivates prosocial behaviors rather than merely
intentions, and whether it does so in a manner more similar to the Negative State Relief model or
to SCMEs.
By recalling a relevant life experience, participants will be induced to feel regret, guilt,
sadness, or a neutral control, and then they will be presented with the option to help the
researcher. This help will come in the form of the participant donating their time by repeatedly
clicking a button on the survey to indicate how much money the researcher should donate to one
of two charitable organizations at the end of the study, up to $1.00 per participant. One of the
charity options will be specifically interpersonal as well, considering that guilt is an interpersonal
emotion and may motivate participants in that condition to show a disproportionate desire to help
others directly. Additionally, this methodology will be used to examine both a standard
undergraduate sample of participants, as well as an adult sample. This will be done in order to
examine whether older individuals with more life experience perhaps have more intense regretful
experiences and if the intensity of their feelings of regret may strengthen the effects of
experiencing regret on helping behaviors. Given the developmental literature that indicates
people’s experiences of regret change with age, it seems likely that there will be differences
between the two sample populations. Furthermore, Study 2 is a replication and extension of
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Study 1 and includes measures of hypothesized processes by which the emotion effects may
happen, including empathy and personal distress (Batson et al., 1981) and centrality of event to
self (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).
Study 1. First, recalling an experience of negative affect was predicted to motivate
higher amounts prosocial behavior (via donation clicks) than the control condition. Second,
regret was predicted to be the negative emotion that motivates the highest amounts of prosocial
behavior (via donation clicks) when compared to all other conditions. Third, because of the
interpersonal nature of guilt, participants in the guilt condition were predicted to select the
person-relevant (interpersonal) charity more often than participants in any other emotion
condition. Finally, middle-adult participants (the Prolific sample) were expected to be more
influenced by recollecting the experience of regret, but not guilt or sadness, than the young-adult
participants (the student sample).
Study 2. In the second study, it was predicted that all results from Study 1 would be
replicated. It was also predicted that overall empathy intensity would predict increased prosocial
behavior (via donation clicks) and overall distress intensity would also predict increased
prosocial behavior (via donation clicks). It was also predicted that the Prolific sample would
have higher centrality of event to self ratings than the student sample for the memories they
reported, specifically in the regret condition. It was also predicted that participants who report
higher levels of political liberalism would engage in higher amounts of prosocial behavior (via
donation clicks) than participants who report higher levels of political conservatism.

Study 1
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Method
Participants
Participants for Study 1 consisted of 246 General Psychology students recruited online from the
undergraduate participant pool using Sona Systems, and 232 middle-adult participants recruited
from the survey site Prolific, resulting in a cumulative sample of 478 participants before
exclusions. In the student sample, 9 participants were excluded for missing survey responses or
not answering the emotion condition prompt, and in the Prolific sample 1 participant was
excluded for not answering the emotion condition prompt, resulting in a total combined sample
of 468 participants. This sample size was decided due to a power analysis done for my 2020
study which indicated that 100 participants per emotion experience condition ought to be
sufficient to observe the effects of the manipulation at 95% confidence. The overall sample
consisted of 49% females, 49% males, and .002% who identified as a gender outside the gender
binary. The majority of participants in the overall sample identified themselves as
White/Caucasian (82%), and the remainder of the sample identified themselves as
Black/African-American (11%), Hispanic/Latinx (7%), Native American/American Indian (1%),
Other (1%), or Asian (.01%). The age of participants in the combined sample ranged from 18 to
73 years, with an average age of 29.17 years old. The students were compensated for their time
with partial credit toward a research requirement for participating in the study, and the Prolific
sample was compensated with a payment of $2.38 per person for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
Study 1 was conducted entirely online via a Qualtrics survey, for which sample size,
materials, and the analysis plan were preregistered. Student participants accessed the informed
consent, and upon agreeing to the informed consent, they were redirected to a second survey to
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be allowed to participate in the study, so that no participants’ names were connected to their
survey responses. Prolific participants input only their Prolific ID in lieu of a typed signature on
the informed consent, so their form was part of the same survey as the rest of the study. The
study used four randomly-assigned between-subjects conditions.
To begin, participants were randomly presented with one of four prompts asking them to
write about their most intense memory of something they have done that makes them feel either
regret, guilt or sadness, or a control condition which prompted participants to write about the TV
show they have most recently watched. Participants were also asked to rate on a sliding scale
from 0 to 100 how positive or negative that memory made them feel, with lower numbers
indicating more negative mood and higher numbers indicating more positive mood.
After writing about whichever prompt they were assigned, participants were then
informed that the researchers would be making a charitable donation to two charities: Feeding
America and the National Park Foundation. These charities were specifically selected so that
participants would have a person-relevant option (interpersonal option) and an environmentrelevant option that affects everyone in the world, including the participants themselves
(intrapersonal option). Participants were told that each time they click a button, the researchers
would donate a further 1 cent, up to a maximum value of $1, per the methodology from Beike et
al. (2009). Participants were allowed to select one of the two charities to have the researchers
make a donation to on their behalf, and were then asked to click a button labeled “Donate 1 cent”
either until the total, which was displayed on the screen for the participant to see, reached $1.00,
or until the participant decided that they no longer wished to continue clicking and clicked
another button labeled “I’m done donating.”
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After the donation task, participants were presented with a battery of fifteen positive and
negative emotions: regret, guilt, shame, embarrassment, sadness, disappointment, anger, disgust,
hate, joy, elation, pride, excitement, fear, and anxiety. Participants were asked to rate on a
Likert-type scale from 1 to 7 how much the memory they wrote about makes them feel each
emotion, such that 1 indicates very little, and 7 indicates very much. Participants were again
asked to rate on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 how positive or negative that memory made them
feel, with lower numbers indicating more negative mood and higher numbers indicating more
positive mood. This was intended to determine whether there was an overall mood change after
the donation measure. Participants were also asked to indicate whether the memory they recalled
was interpersonal or intrapersonal, and whether feel they have complete closure on the memory
they disclosed, on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 indicating Strongly disagree and with 7 indicating
Strongly agree.
At this point, participants were given a series of demographic questions to answer. They
were asked to report their gender (with the options “Male,” “Female,” and “Other”). They were
also asked their age and race. Finally they were asked whether English is their first language.
This final question is important largely because different languages and cultures have different
comprehensions of what emotions mean and feel like, so it is useful to know whether the
participants are native English-speakers, presumably with an English-speaker’s comprehension
of regret, guilt, and sadness.
Finally, participants underwent a mood-boosting exercise to reduce any potential ill
effects of being asked to dwell on negative emotions for the duration of the study. All
participants were given a prompt that instructed them to write about a memory of something they
have done that makes them feel proud, regardless of what emotion condition they were
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randomly-assigned to at the beginning of the study. Following the mood-boosting exercise,
participants were given a debriefing as to the purpose and predictions of the study, and then
dismissed.
Results
All planned analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS Statistics 27 software
program. The exploratory SEM analyses were conducted using R statistical software with
functions from the lavaaan and psych packages.
Planned Analyses
Battery of Emotions. A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the
effect of emotion condition and sample on regret intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and
sadness conditions among the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main
effect of emotion condition on regret intensity between the four emotion conditions (F(3, 456) =
125.54, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that mean regret
intensity for the control condition was significantly lower than mean regret intensity for the
regret, guilt, and sadness conditions. Mean regret intensity for the sadness condition was also
significantly lower than mean regret intensity for the regret and guilt conditions. However, mean
regret intensity was not significantly different between the regret and guilt conditions (see Table
1 for mean comparisons). There was also a significant main effect of sample on regret intensity
(F(1, 456) = 8.77, p < .003). Mean regret intensity for the undergraduate sample (M = 3.97, SE =
.110) was significantly lower than mean regret intensity for the Prolific sample (M = 4.43, SE =
.110). There was also a significant interaction between emotion condition and sample (F(3, 456)
= 2.71, p < .044). Post-hoc comparisons indicate that mean regret intensity for undergraduates in
the sadness condition (M = 3.56, SE = .221) was significantly lower than mean regret intensity
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for the Prolific sample in the sadness condition (M = 4.78, SE = .219). There appeared to be no
significant differences between undergraduates in the control condition (M = 1.67, SE = .225)
and the Prolific sample in the control condition (M = 1.87, SE = .214). There appeared to be no
significant differences between undergraduates in the regret condition (M = 5.63, SE = .215) and
the Prolific sample in the regret condition (M = 5.74, SE = .221). There appeared to be no
significant differences between undergraduates in the guilt condition (M = 5.00, SE = .215) and
the Prolific sample in the guilt condition (M = 5.32, SE = .223). Taken together, these data
indicate that when participants were induced to recall memories of an affectively-neutral
stimulus (eg. a TV show) or a sad event, they experienced significantly less intense feelings of
regret than when participants were induced to recall memories of a regretful or guilty event.
However, there appear to be no significant differences in the experience of regret intensity when
participants were induced to recall a guilty experience rather than a regretful experience, and
these effects are slightly amplified in the Prolific sample as compared to the undergraduate
sample. These findings mostly support the hypothesis, however regret and guilt conditions were
expected to differ in regret intensity from each other.
A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of emotion
condition and sample on guilt intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions among
the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main effect of emotion
condition on guilt intensity between the four emotion conditions (F(3, 456) = 109.30, p < .001).
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that mean guilt intensity for the
control condition was significantly lower than the mean guilt intensity in the regret, guilt, and
sadness conditions. Mean guilt intensity in the sadness condition was also significantly lower
than the mean guilt intensity in the regret and guilt conditions. However, there was no
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significant difference in mean guilt intensity between the regret and guilt conditions (see Table 2
for mean comparisons). There was also a significant main effect of sample on guilt intensity
(F(1, 456) = 4.23, p < .04). Mean guilt intensity for the undergraduate sample (M = 3.59, SE =
.116) was lower than mean guilt intensity for the Prolific sample (M = 3.93, SE = .116). Taken
together, these data indicate that when participants were induced to recall memories of an
affectively-neutral stimulus (eg. a TV show) or a sad event, they experienced significantly less
intense feelings of guilt than when participants were induced to recall memories of a regretful or
guilty event. However, there appeared to be no significant differences in the experience of guilt
intensity when participants were induced to recall a guilty experience rather than a regretful
experience, and these effects are slightly amplified in the Prolific sample as compared to the
undergraduate sample. These findings mostly supported the hypothesis, however regret and guilt
conditions were expected to differ in guilt intensity.
A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of emotion
condition and sample on sadness intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions
among the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main effect of emotion
condition on sadness intensity between the four emotion conditions (F(3, 456) = 1, p < .001).
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that mean sadness intensity for the
control condition was significantly lower than mean sadness intensity for the regret, guilt, and
sadness conditions. Mean sadness intensity for the sadness condition was significantly greater
than mean sadness intensity for the regret and guilt conditions. However, mean sadness intensity
for the regret and guilt conditions was not significantly different (see Table 3 for mean
comparisons). There was also a significant main effect of sample on mean sadness intensity
(F(1, 456) = 5.37, p < .021). Mean sadness intensity in the undergraduate sample (M = 4.24, SE
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= .110) was significantly lower than mean sadness intensity in the Prolific sample (M = 4.60, SE
= .110). Taken together, these data indicate that when participants were induced to recall
memories of an affectively-neutral stimulus (eg. a TV show) they experienced significantly less
intense feelings of sadness than when participants were induced to recall memories of a regretful,
sad, or guilty event, and participants who were induced to recall memories of a sad event
experienced significantly more intense feelings of sadness. However, there appear to be no
significant differences in the experience of sadness intensity when participants were induced to
recall a guilty experience rather than a regretful experience, and these effects were slightly
amplified in the Prolific sample as compared to the undergraduate sample. These findings
mostly supported the hypothesis, except that regret and guilt conditions were expected to differ
in sadness intensity.
Further 2x4 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted for all of the other emotions on
the battery of emotions but are not included here for the sake of brevity. Those analyses are
available upon request, but the general trend remained that the control condition was
significantly different from the emotion conditions, and regret and guilt tended to not be
significantly different from one another. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of regret,
guilt, and sadness intensity.
Charity Selection. A chi-square test of independence was conducted to examine the
relationship between emotion condition and charity selection. The relationship between these
variables was not significant, X2 (3, 469) = 6.68, p = .083. Charity selection did not differ by
emotion condition, which did not support the hypothesis.
Helping Behavior. A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the
effect of emotion condition and sample on prosocial behavior (via number of donation clicks) in
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the control, regret, guilt, and sadness emotion conditions. There was no significant main effect
of emotion condition on prosocial behavior (F(3, 465) = .542, p < .654). There were no
differences in prosocial behavior between the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions
(Figure 2). These findings were not consistent with the hypothesis.
Sample Comparison. A 2 x 4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the
effects of emotion condition (control, regret, guilt, or sadness) and sample (undergraduate or
Prolific) on prosocial behavior (via number of donation clicks). There was a marginal main
effect of sample (F(1, 469) = 3.53, p < .061). These data suggest that adults over the age of 30
may be more likely to engage in prosocial behavior than college-aged adults (Figure 3). This
finding was consistent with the hypothesis.
Emotions Regression. A multiple regression was conducted to examine whether regret,
guilt, and sadness intensity predict prosocial behavior (via number of donation clicks). See
Tables 4 and 5 for statistics. It was found that regret, guilt, and sadness intensity did not account
for a significant amount of the variance in the amount of prosocial behavior measured in number
of donation clicks (F(3, 461) = .710, p < .547, R2 = .005, R2Adjusted = -.002).
Exploratory Analyses
SEM. A structural equation model was conducted in R using the lavaan package to test
whether prosocial behavior mediates a change in overall affect from time 1 to time 2, per the
Negative State Relief model. The path model used for this analysis is represented in Figure 4.
The regret, guilt, and sadness conditions were each transformed into dummy-coded variables for
the purposes of this analysis. The determination of model fit was decided based on a comparison
of fit indices in this model with the suggested cutoff values frequently cited in the literature for
CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR indices (Steiger, 2016) and χ2 is reported solely in compliance with
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traditional conventions. The model was determined to have “good” model fit based on these
standards (χ2 (6) = 14.12, p < .028, CFI = .988, RMSEA = .056, SRMR = .022). Because fit was
determined to be good, no further revisions based on modification indices were completed.
With model fit determined to be acceptable, it is appropriate to interpret the model as-is.
Results of the regression analyses indicated that there was no significant indirect effect of
prosocial behavior on change in overall affect from time 1 to time 2. Specifically, there was a
non-significant relationship between overall affect at time 1 and prosocial behavior (β = -.061, p
< .201). There was also a non-significant relationship between prosocial behavior and overall
affect at time 2 (β = .039, p < .107). There was, however, a significant effect of the three
negative emotion conditions on overall affect at time 1, such that recalling a memory of regret (β
= -.410, p < .001), guilt (β = -.390, p < .001), and sadness (β = -.409, p < .001) all contributed to
decreased overall affect at time 1. There was also a significant direct effect of overall affect at
time 1 on overall affect at time 2 (β = .864, p < .001). Taken together, these results suggest that
recalling a memory of a negative affective experience does significantly decrease one’s overall
affect, and one’s initial overall affect before the donation task significantly predicts one’s overall
affect after the donation task, but the donation task itself does not cause a significant change in
overall affect at time 2, contrary to the Negative State Relief hypothesis.
Discussion
For Study 1, recalling a regretful experience activated feelings of regret, recalling a guilty
experience activated feelings of guilt, and recalling a sad experience activated feelings of
sadness, as hypothesized. Also as hypothesized, older adults engaged in more prosocial behavior
than younger adults when recalling a regretful experience. However, recalling regret also
activated feelings of guilt, and recalling guilt also activated feelings of regret. There was also no
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effect of emotion condition on charity choice, contrary to hypotheses. Also contrary to
hypotheses, there was no difference in prosocial behavior between emotion conditions, but there
was a sample difference in prosocial behavior such that the older adults engaged in more
prosocial behavior than the younger adults.
Given these results, it appears that contrary to what the prior literature indicates, negative
emotions may not be a consistent motivator of prosocial behavior. There also appears to be an
age difference to the effects of emotional experiences on prosocial behavior. Because these
results contradict the prior literature, it is necessary to test whether they can be replicated, which
will be the primary purpose of Study 2. The replication study will also be extended with the
addition of new measures to begin exploring what factors may be driving the age difference in
prosocial behavior, if it is not negative affect. Centrality of event is defined as the degree to
which people see a stressful life event as central to their identity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).
Centrality of event to self could explain the age difference, given that the Prolific sample (all
above age 30) would have more life experience than the typical 18-20-year-old undergraduate
student and, by extension, more likelihood that their memories for regretful experiences would
have a stronger effect on their current life and their future decisions. To explain the lack of
difference in prosocial behavior among the emotion conditions, it may be useful to examine the
difference between altruism and egotism as motivation for prosocial behavior. Negative state
relief theory works on the basis that all helping behavior should be motivated from a place of
egotism, because one is helping only to make oneself feel better rather than necessarily acting
only for the sake of helping another person. However, other theory argues that prosocial
behavior instead comes from a place of altruism and empathy, rather than the more pessimistic
view that models like negative state relief take (Batson et al., 1981). In order to examine this
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difference, it is necessary to include measures of empathy, which would relate to the altruism
hypothesis, and of personal distress, which would relate to the Negative State Relief hypothesis,
in Study 2. Finally, some research suggests that someone’s political ideology may make people
more or less likely to engage in the specific donation behavior that this study uses, such that
people who are more politically liberal tend to be more likely to donate to charity on the whole
than people who are politically conservative, so a measure of political ideation will also be added
to the demographic questions to be used as a covariate with the emotion condition and sample
measures (Jost et al., 2009). Because the undergraduate sample was based solely in Arkansas
and tends to be more politically conservative, but the Prolific sample came from all over the
world, just so long as the participant was originally from the United States, there may have been
a confounding effect of political ideology on the sample and adding these measures may help to
parse the sample difference in prosocial behavior.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Participants for Study 2 consisted of 256 General Psychology students recruited online
from the undergraduate participant pool using Sona Systems, and 271 middle-adult participants
recruited from the survey site Prolific, resulting in a cumulative sample of 528 participants
before exclusions. In the student sample, 11 participants were excluded for missing survey
responses or not answering the emotion condition prompt, and in the Prolific sample 30
participants were excluded for missing survey responses or not answering the emotion condition
prompt, resulting in a total combined sample of 487 participants. This sample size was decided
due to a power analysis done for my 2020 study which indicated that 100 participants per
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emotion experience condition ought to be sufficient to observe the effects of the manipulation at
95% confidence. The overall sample consisted of 63% females, 34% males, and .01% who
identified as a gender outside the gender binary. The majority of participants in the overall
sample identified themselves as White/Caucasian (84%), and the remainder of the sample
identified themselves as Hispanic/Latinx (10%), Asian (5%), Black/African-American (5%),
Native American/American Indian (1%), or Other (1%). The age of participants in the combined
sample ranged from 17 to 72 years, with an average age of 31.60 years old. The students were
compensated for their time with partial credit toward a research requirement for participating in
the study, and the Prolific sample was compensated with a payment of $2.55 per person for their
participation.
Materials and Procedure
The procedure was nearly identical to that of Study 1 in an effort to replicate the results.
The only additions were four extra emotions added to the existing 15 in the battery of emotions
presented after the donation task (“Compassion,” “Empathy,” “Distress,” and “Upset”), a
Centrality of Event to Self scale presented after the question about the level of closure
participants have on the memory they disclosed, and three more questions were added to the
demographic questions about participants’ political ideology. The four new emotion items were
taken from an existing scale to assess whether altruistic behaviors are motivated through
empathic concern or personal distress (Batson, et al., 1981). The Centrality of Event to Self
scale was taken from Berntsen & Rubin (2006). The scale included items such as “I feel that this
event has become a part of my identity” and “I feel that this event has become a central part of
my life story” which participants rated on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating Totally disagree
and 5 indicating Totally agree. The items assessing political ideology assessed general political
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ideology, economic political ideology, and social political ideology (Jost et al., 2009). Items
were phrased as “In general (or economically or socially) on a scale from 1 to 7, would you
describe yourself as a liberal or a conservative?” Participants rated themselves on a scale from 1
to 7, where 1 indicated Very liberal and 7 indicated Very conservative.
Results
All planned analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS Statistics 27 software
program. The exploratory SEM analyses were conducted using R statistical software with
functions from the lavaaan and psych packages.
Planned Analyses
Political Ideology. The responses to each of the three questions about political ideology
were averaged together for each participant to create a mean political ideology score (α = .939).
A Pearson’s correlation was conducted to examine whether political ideology is associated with
prosocial behavior (via donation clicks). The Pearson’s correlation revealed that there was a
weak negative association between political ideology and prosocial behavior (r = -.140, n = 478,
p < .002). This suggests that political conservatism had a small negative effect on prosocial
behavior. Although this measure was intended to be used as a covariate, it did not change any of
the reported results below, so it will not be further reported.
Battery of Emotions. A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the
effect of emotion condition and sample on regret intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and
sadness conditions among the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main
effect of emotion condition on regret intensity between the four emotion conditions (F(3, 471) =
184.67, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that mean regret
intensity for the control condition was significantly lower than in the regret, guilt, and sadness
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conditions. Mean regret intensity in the sadness condition was significantly lower than sadness
intensity in the regret and guilt conditions. However, the mean regret intensity for the regret and
guilt conditions were not significantly different from each other (see Table 6 for mean
comparisons). There was also a significant main effect of the sample on regret intensity (F(1,
471) = 6.45, p < .011). Mean regret intensity for the undergraduate sample (M = 4.05, SE =
.100) was significantly lower than mean regret intensity for the Prolific sample (M = 4.42, SE =
.101). There was also a significant interaction between emotion condition and sample (F(3, 471)
= 4.96, p < .002). Post-hoc comparisons indicated that mean regret intensity for undergraduates
in the control condition did not significantly differ from mean regret intensity for the Prolific
sample in the control condition. Mean regret intensity for undergraduates in the regret condition
did not significantly differ from mean regret intensity for the Prolific sample in the regret
conditions. Mean regret intensity for undergraduates in the guilt condition was significantly
lower than mean regret intensity for the Prolific sample in the guilt condition. Mean regret
intensity for undergraduates in the sadness condition was significantly lower than mean regret
intensity for participants in the Prolific sample in the sadness condition (see Table 7 for mean
comparisons). Taken together, these data indicate that when participants were induced to recall
memories of an affectively-neutral stimulus (eg. a TV show) or a sad event, they experienced
significantly less intense feelings of regret than when participants were induced to recall
memories of a regretful or guilty event. However, there appeared to be no significant differences
in the experience of regret intensity when people were induced to recall a guilty experience
rather than a regretful experience. There were, however, sample differences in regret intensity in
the guilt and sadness conditions, such that adults over 30 felt more intense regret than the typical
undergraduate student. These findings support the hypotheses.
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A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of emotion
condition and sample on guilt intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions among
the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main effect of condition on guilt
intensity (F(3, 471) = 164.72, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test
indicated that mean guilt intensity for the control condition was significantly lower than mean
guilt intensity for the regret, guilt, and sadness conditions. Mean guilt intensity for the sadness
condition was significantly lower than mean guilt intensity for the regret and guilt conditions.
Mean guilt intensity for the regret condition was also significantly lower than mean guilt
intensity in the guilt condition (see Table 8 for mean comparisons). There was no significant
main effect of sample on guilt intensity (F(1, 471) = .276, p < .600). There was a significant
interaction of sample by emotion condition (F(3, 471) = 3.37, p < .019). Post-hoc comparisons
indicated that mean guilt intensity for undergraduates in the control condition did not
significantly differ from guilt intensity of the Prolific sample in the control condition. Mean
guilt intensity for undergraduates in the regret condition did not significantly differ from the
mean guilt intensity for the Prolific sample in the regret condition. Mean guilt intensity for
undergraduates in the guilt condition was not significantly different from mean guilt intensity of
the Prolific sample in the guilt condition. Mean guilt intensity for undergraduates in the sadness
condition was not significantly different from mean guilt intensity for the Prolific sample in the
sadness condition. However, undergraduates and the Prolific sample in the control condition
differed from undergraduates and the Prolific sample in the regret, guilt, and sadness conditions
(see Table 9 for mean comparisons). Taken together, these data indicate that when participants
were induced to recall memories of an affectively-neutral stimulus (eg. a TV show) or a sad
event or a regretful event, they experienced significantly less intense feelings of guilt than when
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participants were induced to recall memories of a guilty event. These findings mostly support
the hypotheses, except that this time recalling guilt did not also activate regret as it did in Study
1.
A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of emotion
condition and sample on sadness intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions
among the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main effect of condition
on sadness intensity (F(3, 471) = 154.86, p < .001). Post-hot comparisons using the Tukey HSD
test indicated that mean sadness intensity for the control condition was significantly lower than
the mean sadness intensity for the regret, guilt, and sadness conditions. Mean sadness intensity
for the sadness condition was significantly higher than mean sadness intensity for the regret and
guilt conditions. However, mean sadness intensity for the regret condition and guilt condition
were not significantly different from each other (see Table 10 for mean comparisons). There was
no significant main effect of sample on sadness intensity (F(1, 471) = 3.76, p < .053). There was
a significant interaction between sample and condition (F(3, 471) = 6.92, p < .001). Taken
together, these data indicate that when participants were induced to recall memories of an
affectively-neutral event (eg. a TV show), they experienced significantly less sadness intensity
than when they were induced to recall a regretful or guilty experience, and all three of those
experiences produced less sadness intensity than when participants were induced to recall a sad
experience. There were no differences in sadness intensity when people were induced to recall a
regretful experience rather than a guilty experience and vice versa. These findings supported the
hypothesis.
Further 2x4 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted for all of the other emotions on
the battery of emotions but are not included here for the sake of brevity. Those analyses are
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available upon request, but the general trend remained that the control condition was
significantly different from the emotion conditions, and regret and guilt tended to not be
significantly different from one another. See Figure 5 for a graphical representation of regret,
guilt, and sadness intensity.
Empathy and Distress. Scores for compassion and empathy intensity were averaged
together to create a single overall compassion score for each participant (α = .91). A 2x4
between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of emotion condition and
sample on intensity of overall empathy in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions among
the undergraduate and Prolific samples. There was a significant main effect of emotion
condition on average overall empathy intensity (F(3, 467) = 7.07, p < .001). Post-hoc
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that overall empathy intensity in the regret
condition was significantly lower than the overall empathy intensity in the control, guilt, and
sadness conditions (see Table 11 for mean comparisons). Average overall empathy was
significantly different between the regret condition and the sadness condition, but not
significantly different between the regret condition and the guilt condition. There was no
significant main effect of sample on average overall empathy (F(1, 467) = .165, p < .684). There
was no significant interaction between the condition and the sample on average overall empathy
(F(3, 467) = 1.23, p < .274). Taken together, these results indicate that when participants were
induced to recall an affectively-neutral event (eg. A TV show) they experienced significantly
more empathy from people induced to recall a regretful event, but did not experience
significantly different empathy from people who were induced to recall a guilty or sad event.
People who were induced to recall a sad event experienced significantly more empathy from
people who were induced to recall a regretful experience, but did not experience significantly
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different levels of empathy than people who were induced to recall a guilty experience. People
who were induced to recall a regretful event did not experience significantly different levels of
empathy than people who were induced to recall a guilty event (Figure 6). These findings
supported the hypothesis.
Scores for distress intensity and upset intensity were averaged together to create a single
overall distress intensity score for each participant (α = .89). A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA
was conducted to compare the effects of emotion condition and sample on overall distress
intensity in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions among the undergraduate and
Prolific samples. There was a significant main effect of emotion condition on overall distress
intensity (F(3, 465) = 95.31, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test
indicated that overall distress intensity in the control condition was significantly lower than
overall distress intensity in the regret, guilt, and sadness conditions. Overall distress intensity in
the sadness condition was significantly higher than overall distress intensity in the regret and
guilt conditions. There was no significant difference in overall distress intensity between the
regret and guilt conditions (see Table 12 for mean comparisons). There was no significant main
effect of sample on overall distress intensity (F(1, 465) = .970, p < .325). There was no
significant interaction between sample and emotion condition on overall distress intensity (F(3,
465) = .863, p < .460). Taken together, these data indicate that when participants were induced
to recall an affectively-neutral experience (eg. A TV show) they experienced significantly less
overall distress than when participants were induced to recall a regretful, guilty, or sad
experience. People who were induced to recall a sad memory experienced significantly more
overall distress than people who were induced to recall a regretful or guilty experience. People
who were induced to recall a regretful experience did not experience significantly different
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overall distress than people who were induced to recall a guilty experience (Figure 7). These
findings did not support the hypothesis, but actually went in the opposite direction from the
hypothesis.
Centrality of Event to Self. A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to
examine the effects of emotion condition and sample on centrality of event to self scale ratings in
the control, regret, guilt, and shame conditions for the undergraduate and Prolific samples. All
item responses in the centrality of event to self scale were averaged for each participant to form
an overall score (α = .94), and this average score is what was included in the ANOVA. There
was a significant main effect of sample (F(3, 465) = 6.28, p < .013). There was a significant
main effect of condition (F(3, 465) = 59.30, p < .001). There was a significant interaction
between sample and condition (F(3, 465) = 3.43, p < .017). Post-hoc comparisons using the
Tukey HSD tst indicated that overall centrality of event to self ratings for the control condition
was significantly lower than overall centrality of event to self ratings for the regret, guilt, and
sadness conditions. Overall centrality of event to self ratings for the guilt condition was
significantly lower than overall centrality of event to self ratings for the regret and sadness
conditions. The regret condition and sadness condition did not significantly differ from each
other on overall centrality of event to self ratings (see Table 13 for mean comparisons). There
were significant differences in the centrality of event to self ratings only in the regret condition
between the undergraduate sample (M = 2.74, SE = .136) and the Prolific sample (M = 3.37, SE =
.138). Taken together, these data suggest that when participants were induced to recall an
affectively-neutral experience (eg. A TV show) or a guilty experience, they experienced
significantly less feelings that the experience was central to their sense of self than when people
were induced to recall a regretful or sad experience. These data also suggest that adults over the
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age of 30 (the Prolific sample) experienced significantly more feelings that the experience of
regret and sadness were more central to their current sense of self than the average college-aged
adult (Figure 8). These data partially supported the hypothesis in that regret was not the only
emotion where centrality of event to self significantly differed by sample.
Charity Selection. A chi-square test of independence was conducted to examine the
relationship between emotion condition and charity selection. The relationship between these
variables was not significant, X2 (3, 487) = 1.45, p = .694. Charity selection did not differ by
emotion condition. These data supported the replication hypothesis.
Helping Behavior. A 2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effect of emotion condition and sample on prosocial behavior (via number of donation clicks) in
the control, regret, guilt, and sadness emotion conditions among the undergraduate and Prolific
samples. There was no significant main effect of emotion condition on prosocial behavior (F(3,
485) = .254, p < .859). There was a significant main effect of sample on prosocial behavior F(1,
481) = 19.92, p < .001). The undergraduate sample (M = 22.15, SE = 2.33) engaged in
significantly less prosocial behavior than the Prolific sample (M = 36.91, SE = 2.35). There was
no significant interaction between emotion condition and sample (F(3, 418) = 1.41, p < .239).
Taken together, these data indicate that there were no differences in prosocial behavior between
the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions, but regardless of emotion condition people over
age 30 (the Prolific sample) were more likely to engage in prosocial behavior than the typical
undergraduate student (Figure 9). These findings supported the replication hypotheses.
Emotion Regression. A multiple regression was conducted to examine whether regret,
guilt, sadness, overall empathy, and overall distress predict prosocial behavior (via number of
donation clicks). See Tables 14 and 15 for statistics. Regret, guilt, sadness, overall empathy,
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and overall distress intensities explained a significant amount of the variance in the amount of
prosocial behavior measured in number of donation clicks (F(5, 465) = 2.99, p < .011, R2 = .031,
R2Adjusted = .021). The analysis shows that regret intensity did significantly predict the amount
of prosocial behavior measured in donation clicks (β = .183, t(462) = 2.27, p < .024), as did
overall empathy intensity (β = .126, t(462) = 2.70, p < .007), as well as overall distress intensity
(β = -.143, t(462) = -2.05, p < .041). However, guilt intensity (β = -.104, t(462) = -1.34, p <
.181) and sadness intensity (β = .031, t(462) = .422, p < .673) did not significantly predict the
amount of prosocial behavior measured in donation clicks. Taken together, these data suggest
that the more intense feelings of regret or compassion participants felt, the more likely they were
to engage in prosocial behaviors, while the more intense feelings of distress participants felt, the
less likely they were to engage in prosocial behaviors. These findings supported the replication
hypothesis.
Exploratory Analyses
Study 1 and Study 2 Comparison. A 2x2x4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted
to examine the effects emotion condition and sample on prosocial behavior (via donation clicks)
in the control, regret, guilt, and sadness conditions for the undergraduate and Prolific samples in
study 1 and study 2. There was a significant main effect of only the sample (F(1, 942) = 18.43, p
< .001). Prosocial behavior was overall higher in the Prolific sample (M = 36.46, SE = 1.73)
than in the undergraduate sample (M = 26.02, SE = 1.71) regardless of emotion condition or
study. Taken together, these results indicate that only the sample had a significant effect on
prosocial behavior, such that the older Prolific sample consistently engaged in more prosocial
behavior than the younger undergraduate sample (Figure 10).
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SEM. A structural equation model was conducted in R using the lavaan package to test
whether prosocial behavior mediates a change in overall affect from time 1 to time 2, per the
Negative State Relief model. The path model used for this analysis is represented in Figure 11.
Regret, guilt, and sadness were dummy-coded into three separate variables for the purposes of
this analysis. The determination of model fit was decided based on a comparison of fit indices in
this model with the suggested cutoff values frequently cited in the literature for CFI, RMSEA,
and SRMR indices (Steiger, 2016) and χ2 is reported solely in compliance with traditional
conventions. The model was determined to have “good” model fit based on these standards (χ2
(6) = 6.63, p < .356, CFI = .999, RMSEA = .015, SRMR = .015). Because fit was determined to
be good, no further revisions based on modification indices were completed.
With model fit determined to be acceptable, it is appropriate to interpret the model as-is.
Results of the regression analyses indicated that there was a significant indirect effect of
prosocial behavior on change in overall affect from time 1 to time 2. Specifically, there was a
significant relationship between overall affect at time 1 and prosocial behavior (β = -.092, p <
.048). There was also a significant relationship between prosocial behavior and overall affect at
time 2 (β = .083, p < .001). There was also a significant effect of the three negative emotion
conditions on overall affect at time 1, such that recalling a memory of regret (β = -.427, p <
.001), guilt (β = -.452, p < .001), and sadness (β = -.409, p < .001) all contributed to decreased
overall affect at time 1. There was also a significant direct effect of overall affect at time 1 on
overall affect at time 2 (β = .870, p < .001). Taken together, these results suggest that recalling a
memory of a negative affective experience did significantly decrease participants’ overall affect,
and participants’ initial overall affect before the donation task significantly predicted their
overall affect after the donation task, and the donation task itself caused a small but significant
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change in overall affect at time 2, in support of the Negative State Relief hypothesis but contrary
to findings from Study 1.
Discussion
For Study 2, recalling regret activated feelings of regret, recalling guilt activated feelings
of guilt, and recalling sadness activated feelings of sadness, as hypothesized. Also as
hypothesized, recalling regret also activated feelings of guilt, but unlike in Study 1, recalling
guilt did not also activate feelings of regret. There was also no effect of emotion condition on
charity choice, as hypothesized. There was no difference in prosocial behavior between emotion
conditions, but there was a sample difference in prosocial behavior such that the older adults
engaged in more prosocial behavior than the younger adults, as hypothesized. As hypothesized,
overall empathy intensity significantly predicted increased prosocial behavior, but contrary to the
hypothesis overall distress intensity significantly predicted decreased prosocial behavior. As
hypothesized, older adults had higher centrality of event to self scores than younger adults,
specifically in the regret condition but not any of the other emotion conditions. Contrary to the
hypothesis, political ideology did not affect any of the outcome variables beyond the effects of
emotion condition and sample.
General Discussion
Taking all these results together, it appears that the experience of negative affect in
general is not the primary motivator for prosocial behavior, at least not in the form of donating
one’s time through a paradigm like what was used for the purposes of these two studies. Instead,
the three factors that appear to increase the amount of prosocial behavior these participants
engaged in were the sample, overall empathy intensity, and centrality of event to self.
Participants’ overall distress appeared to decrease the amount of prosocial behavior they were
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willing to engage in, contrary to what the prior literature on Negative State Relief and selfconscious moral emotions suggests.
To first address the issue of overall distress and where it fits within the pre-existing
literature, according to the Negative State Relief model one might expect that increased feelings
of personal distress should motivate more prosocial behavior, in an effort to alleviate one’s own
distress through doing good deeds (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). Negative State Relief theory
takes a particularly negative view on the reasons why people may choose to behave prosocially,
positing that people are willing to help others if there is something in it for them as well. In this
perspective, any helping behavior comes from a place of egoism—I feel uncomfortable seeing
this other person suffering, so in order to make me feel better, I have to fix their problems first—
rather than from a place of altruism—This person is suffering and I want to do what I can to
make them feel better. Taking the opposing stance, Batson et al. (1981) found evidence
suggesting that perhaps the Negative State Relief model may not be entirely accurate and that
instead people are more likely to help others when they experience more compassion, regardless
of whether it is easier to help the other person or to simply avoid the other person, while people
are less likely to help other people when they experience more personal distress, so long as
avoiding the person entirely is easy for them to do. The results of Study 2 provide support to
Batson et al.’s (1981) findings, as these results followed the same pattern.
Given that participants were aware from the beginning of the donation task that they were
free to end the task at any time, escape from helping and from the reminders on each donation
page that they were to be helping the researchers by clicking and the charity of their choice with
the subsequent donation should have been relatively easy, even if escaping from their negative
emotions would not be so easy. And if one assumes that Batson et al.’s (1981) findings can
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apply to helping tasks and not just to the experience of emotion, it would stand to reason that
these data may have shown a greater effect of emotion condition on prosocial behavior if
participants had been required to donate a certain amount of their time (through clicking) before
they were permitted to end the task, rather than giving them an opportunity to end the task
immediately without donating any time. So given the ease of escape from the task and the
people the task was meant to help, it was found that increased feelings of distress led to
decreased donation clicks before participants ended the task. On the other hand, also in support
of Batson et al.’s (1981) findings, increased feelings of compassion led to increased donation
clicks before participants ended the task. And these findings taken together imply that prosocial
behavior was motivated through altruistic intentions, rather than egoistical ones, which may
explain why these studies did not show an effect of emotion condition on prosocial behavior.
Both of the hypothesized mechanisms by which emotion ought to have motivated
prosocial behavior were, in nature, egoistical rather than altruistic. The Negative State Relief
model implies that people engage in helping behaviors in order to make themselves feel better
(an egoistical motivation) and the definition of SCMEs suggests that people only experience
moral emotions when we self-reflect on how our own actions affect others which, in many cases,
ties to how we believe our actions will make others think of us and how that will affect our
reputation (which is also an egoistical motivation). So given that participants may have been
feeling personally distressed and predisposed to think egoistically about their negative emotions
because they were asked to think about how their negative emotional memories made the
participants themselves feel, rather than how those events may have made others feel, it follows
that there would not be an effect of emotion condition on prosocial behavior when it is likely that
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participants were attempting to avoid or escape their own distress, rather than feeling sufficient
compassion to be motivated to help others instead.
As for why there was an effect of sample on prosocial behavior, one may suggest a few
potential explanations, but two stand out as the most likely under these circumstances. First,
there may have been an observed an effect of age and life experience, although age was
confounded by sample since everyone in the Prolific samples were over the age of 30 while all
participants in the student samples were under the age of 30. The findings from the centrality of
event to self scale support this explanation. It was hypothesized that the Prolific sample would
have higher centrality of event to self scale ratings than the undergraduate sample due to greater
life experience (the Prolific sample has been alive longer and has had more opportunities to have
more significant life experiences than the average 18-20 year-old college freshman) and the data
did follow the predicted pattern. This was especially the case with the regret emotion condition,
which is relevant because of the nature of regret.
The existing literature on regret suggests that one of regret’s primary actions is to
motivate reparative action, and in many cases that reparative action comes in the form of
avoiding making the same mistakes in the future (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Along the same
lines, the centrality of event to self scale is designed to examine how much an event shapes a
person’s decisions moving forward and how much that event shapes their view of themselves
(Berntsen & Reuben, 2006). Thus, when participants in the regret condition had increased
centrality of event to self scores (as was the case in the Prolific sample when compared to the
student sample) that motivation to engage in reparative action may have also motivated more
prosocial behavior which would potentially explain why the Prolific sample spent more time on
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the donation task than the student sample did, especially within the regret condition in Study 1,
although the distribution across emotion conditions was a bit more even in Study 2.
On the other hand, the observed sample difference could instead be a difference in
motivation. Prolific participants take studies as a job and typically participate in many studies in
any given day, so it may simply be that the psychological cost of clicking a button repeatedly and
donating their time might be less than the psychological cost of the same behaviors for
undergraduate students who complete studies only in order to complete a course requirement.
This explanation feels less compelling, however, in light of the fact that for both samples
participants were given the same compensation regardless of how long they spent on the
donation task, so the Prolific sample was paid the same amount regardless of how much time
they spent making donation clicks. This means that it was more cost effective for Prolific
participants to do the bare minimum on the donation task, rather than spending their time
clicking through dozens of screens that would not change their compensation at the end of the
study. Given that the Prolific sample was more likely to continue clicking through the donation
task far longer than the student sample did, despite this making no difference in their
compensation at the end of the study, this appears to lend more support to the altruism
explanation. The Prolific sample may have simply been overall more altruistically-motivated
than the student sample, because they continued the donation task longer than the student sample
did without receiving anything in return. It is worth noting here that no large changes in overall
affect ratings from time one to time two were observed (per the exploratory SEM analyses)
which suggests that participants did not receive the predicted mood-boosting benefit of the
donation task and, again, lends itself to the altruism explanation.
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To address the issue of the charity selection hypothesis finding no support, despite the
relatively well-documented literature on the interpersonal nature of guilt, the choice of charities
in these studies may have confounded our ability to parse a difference in charity selection.
While the researcher spent a significant amount of time researching charities in order to find
politically-neutral organizations, it is entirely possible that they were not affectively-neutral
organizations. It was intended to find organizations that one could explain as relating only to
other people or to both oneself and others and that should not be morally objectionable
regardless of one’s political ideology. However, the researcher did not take into account the fact
that feeding hungry people might produce a stronger emotional response than funding national
parks. Given that the majority of participants, regardless of study or condition, chose Feeding
America, it seems that this charity may have been more compelling to participants in general
than the National Park Foundation. Unfortunately, these studies did not measure people’s
particular feelings about the charities, so these data cannot definitively explain why these results
followed this pattern.
Limitations
It may have been possible to determine the causes of the results that were observed in
these two studies with the addition of further measures. First, other researchers who used the
same undergraduate sample, especially the same one that was used for Study 2, have indicated
that this sample was particularly inattentive. In other studies, this student sample has done
particularly poorly with attention checks, which suggests that they were likely just clicking
buttons and trying to get through the study as quickly as possible. Overall affect scores were
lower for the samples used in Study 2, which may support this particular assessment, although
these studies had no explicit attention check we could use to affirm the inattentiveness
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explanation. There was also no pilot test of the charity options to assess whether they were truly
as neutral as intended when it seems that perhaps a pilot study should have been done, or at least
allowed participants to explain their thoughts as to why they selected the charity they did. The
donation task may have also been too easy for participants to escape from without consequences,
which may have eliminated the differences in prosocial behavior we may have otherwise
observed between conditions.
Future Directions
For future studies, one may consider using a different helping task to see whether a
different task will generate different results across emotion conditions in the predicted pattern.
Perhaps an in-person task where the participant must face another human being face-to-face in
order to escape the helping task would lead to greater amounts of prosocial behavior. The
anonymity and lack of consequences to the donation task used in these studies may have been the
culprit of the lack of differences across conditions when the observed prosocial behavior
appeared to be motivated by altruism rather than egotism.
One may also examine the relationship between regret and guilt more deeply in future
research. While there is a paper (Zeelenberg & Breugelmans, 2007) that suggests regret and
guilt are two completely different emotions in both feeling and function, these studies and my
2020 studies indicate that this may not actually be the case. Participants in the regret and guilt
emotion conditions did not feel significantly different from each other (except for in the guilt
condition in Study 2) and they did not behave significantly differently from each other, which
seems to suggest that either the experience of these emotions may not be functionally different or
that participants do not have the introspective capacity to parse apart the difference between
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regret and guilt for themselves, and so they experience the emotions in essentially the same way
despite the theoretical nuances that distinguish the two emotions from one another.
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Appendix A. Results Figures
Figure 1
Study 1 Effect of Emotion Condition and Sample on Regret, Guilt, and Sadness Intensity

Note. Regret, guilt, and sadness intensity are measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where
1 is the least intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Figure 2
Study 1 Effect of Emotion Condition on Prosocial Behavior

Note. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is
equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00.
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Figure 3
Study 1 Effect of Sample on Prosocial Behavior

Note. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is
equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00.
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Figure 4
Study 1 Path Model for SEM

Note. *** p < .001. Overall affect at time 1 and time 2 measured from a range of 0 to 100 where
smaller number indicate more negative affect and higher numbers indicate more positive affect.
Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is equivalent
to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00.
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Figure 5
Study 2 Effect of Emotion Condition and Sample on Regret, Guilt, and Sadness Intensity

Note. Regret, guilt, and sadness intensity are measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where
1 is the least intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Figure 6
Study 2 Effect of Emotion Condition and Sample on Overall Empathy Intensity

Note. Overall empathy intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the
least intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Figure 7
Study 2 Effects of Emotion Condition and Sample on Overall Distress Intensity

Note. Overall distress intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the
least intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Figure 8
Study 2 Effects of Emotion Condition and Sample on Centrality of Event to Self

Note. Centrality of event to self is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is
Strongly Disagree and 5 is Strongly Agree.
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Figure 9
Study 2 Effects of Emotion Condition and Sample on Prosocial Behavior

Note. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is
equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00.
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Figure 10
Study 1 and Study 2 Comparison of Emotion Condition and Sample on Prosocial Behavior

Note. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is
equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00.
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Figure 11
Study 2 Path Model for SEM

Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001. Overall affect at time 1 and time 2 measured from a range of 0 to
100 where smaller number indicate more negative affect and higher numbers indicate more
positive affect. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each
click is equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00.
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Appendix B. Results Tables
Table 1
Mean Comparisons for Regret Intensity in Study 1
Emotion Condition

M

SD

Control

1.78

1.32

Regret

5.68

1.54

Guilt

5.16

1.76

Sadness

4.17

2.06

Note. Regret intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.

Table 2
Mean Comparisons for Guilt Intensity in Study 1
Emotion Condition

M

SD

Control

1.59

1.13

Regret

4.85

2.04

Guilt

5.37

1.56

Sadness

3.23

2.15

Note. Guilt intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 3
Mean Comparisons for Sadness Intensity in Study 1
Emotion Condition

M

SD

Control

1.97

1.46

Regret

4.95

1.90

Guilt

4.80

1.93

Sadness

5.97

1.32

Note. Sadness intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least
intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1 Variables
Variable
1.

n

M

SD

1

2

3

4

470

32.78

38.68

__

-.031

.004

.018

2. Regret

465

4.20

2.26

-.031

__

.754**

.624**

3. Guilt

465

3.77

2.30

.004

.754**

__

.538**

4.

465

4.42

2.23

.018

.624**

.538**

__

Prosocial
Behavior

Sadness
Note. ** p < .01 (two-tailed). Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks,
where each click is equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of
$1.00. Regret, guilt, and sadness intensity are measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7,
where 1 is the least intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 5
Study 1 Multiple Regression of Emotion Intensity on Prosocial Behavior
Effect

Estimate

SE

95% CI
LL

p
UL

Regret

-1.85

1.32

-4.44

.747 .162

Guilt

.937

1.20

-1.42

3.29 .435

Sadness

.957

1.04

-1.09

3.00 .358

Note. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is
equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00. CI =
confidence interval, LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit.

Table 6
Mean Comparisons for Regret Intensity in Study 2
Emotion Condition

M

SD

Control

1.60

1.24

Regret

5.82

1.29

Guilt

5.53

1.46

Sadness

3.96

2.15

Note. Regret intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 7
Mean Comparisons for Regret Intensity Across Samples in Study 2
Sample

Emotion Condition

M

SD

Undergraduate

Control

1.82

1.30

Prolific

Control

1.39

1.24

Undergraduate

Regret

5.75

1.15

Prolific

Regret

5.89

1.41

Undergraduate

Guilt

5.06

1.57

Prolific

Guilt

6.03

1.14

Undergraduate

Sadness

3.58

2.00

Prolific

Sadness

4.34

2.25

Note. Regret intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.

Table 8
Mean Comparisons for Guilt Intensity in Study 2
Emotion Condition

M

SD

Control

1.39

.952

Regret

4.94

1.93

Guilt

5.74

1.38

Sadness

3.36

2.10

Note. Guilt intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 9
Mean Comparisons for Guilt Intensity Across Samples in Study 2
Sample

Emotion Condition

M

SD

Undergraduate

Control

1.57

1.11

Prolific

Control

1.21

.733

Undergraduate

Regret

5.14

1.88

Prolific

Regret

4.74

1.98

Undergraduate

Guilt

5.39

1.52

Prolific

Guilt

6.12

1.11

Undergraduate

Sadness

3.19

1.94

Prolific

Sadness

3.53

2.25

Note. Guilt intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.

Table 10
Mean Comparisons for Sadness Intensity in Study 2
Emotion Condition

M

SD

Control

1.89

1.43

Regret

5.02

1.89

Guilt

5.13

1.89

Sadness

6.07

1.32

Note. Guilt intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 11
Mean Comparisons for Overall Empathy Intensity in Study 2
Emotion Condition

M

SE

Control

3.57

.169

Regret

2.87

.175

Guilt

3.48

.172

Sadness

3.98

.168

Note. Overall empathy intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the
least intense and 7 is the most intense.

Table 12
Mean Comparisons for Overall Distress Intensity in Study 2
Emotion Condition

M

SE

Control

1.74

.147

Regret

4.12

.150

Guilt

4.27

.146

Sadness

5.05

.145

Note. Overall distress intensity is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the
least intense and 7 is the most intense.
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Table 13
Mean Comparisons for Overall Centrality of Event to Self in Study 2
Emotion Condition

M

SE

Control

1.67

.097

Regret

3.06

.097

Guilt

2.42

.094

Sadness

3.30

.093

Note. Centrality of event to self is measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is
Strongly Disagree and 5 is Strongly Agree.
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Table 14
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 2 Variables
Variable

N

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1.

489

29.43

37.221

__

.035

-.020

-.007

.122**

-.061

2. Regret 479

4.20

2.30

.035

__

.791**

.593**

-.023

.523**

3. Guilt

479

3.84

2.34

-.020

.791**

__

.551**

-.012

.517**

4.

479

4.53

2.29

-.007

.593**

.551**

__

.103*

.746**

475

3.49

1.90

.122**

-.023

-.012

.103*

__

.123**

475

3.80

2.02

-.061

.523**

.517**

.746**

.123**

__

Prosocial
Behavior

Sadness
5.
Overall
Empathy
6.
Overall
Distress
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed). Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number
of clicks, where each click is equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent
clicks of $1.00. Regret, guilt, and sadness intensity are measured on a Likert-type scale from 1
to 7, where 1 is the least intense and 7 is the most intense. Overall empathy and distress intensity
are measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly
agree.
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Table 15
Study 2 Multiple Regression of Emotion Intensity on Prosocial Behavior
Effect

Estimate

SE

95% CI
LL

p

UL

Regret

2.97

1.31

.394

5.54 .024

Guilt

-1.65

1.23

-4.07

.770 .181

Sadness

.512

1.21

-1.87

2.89 .673

Overall

2.49

.920

.677

4.29 .007

-2.65

1.30

-5.21

Empathy
Overall

-.108

.041

Distress
Note. Prosocial behavior is measured in units of total number of clicks, where each click is
equivalent to one cent, up to a total possible number of one-cent clicks of $1.00. Regret, guilt,
and sadness intensity are measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is the least intense
and 7 is the most intense. Overall empathy and distress intensity are measured on a Likert-type
scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree. CI = confidence interval,
LL = lower limit, UL = upper limit.

